of criticism is characterised by principled arguments intended to elucidate the intricacy of the interpretive concepts underlying the issues presented to the Court. 4 These analyses, however, overlook the exceptional noteworthiness of the lesson to be drawn from this case: namely, that litigation before the ECtHR alleging violations of the religious freedoms recognised by the Convention, as interpreted repeatedly by the ECtHR itself, is an ineffectual means of challenging the "non-coercive" symbolic nexus between religion and the state. The common criticisms highlighted above are to a great extent misplaced, because one can reasonably conclude that the Court has interpreted the religious freedoms recognised by the Convention adequately. The unease with the symbolic endorsement of religion by the state, however, points to the need to rethink the current situation in Europe through novel arguments that go beyond the protection of the religious freedoms afforded by the Convention. It requires a more profound engagement with the political commitments that culturally diverse states must subscribe to in order to develop and maintain stable and prosperous societies.
In order to fully comprehend the unfair implications arising from the endorsement of religious symbols by the state one must scrutinise the way in which "the state's symbolic acts and speech affect the status of citizenship, as they enhance or diminish the sense of selfrespect that citizens derive from being able to identify with their political institutions". 5 This theoretical framework, characterised by Cécile Laborde as a "republican liberal political" viewpoint, questions the moral legitimacy of the symbolic endorsement of religion by the state because it affects the standing of individuals within the political community, either in their benefit or to their detriment, in a manner inconsistent with a rich conception of citizenship that is concerned with the civic status and the recognition afforded to all the members of a democratic society on equal terms. 6 This approach places the onus on states to rethink their relations with religion as a means of affirming their commitment to political equality, in the face of increasing diversity across the continent.
This argument is illustrated through three main sections. The first section presents an overview of the decisions handed down in Lautsi by the Chamber and the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. The second section analyses the religious jurisprudence of the ECtHR and contends that the Grand Chamber correctly applied it to the case at hand. will explore the political relevance of a state's symbolic nexus with religion. It explains why appearances matter from the viewpoint of a rich conception of citizenship.
B. THE CASE OF LAUTSI v ITALY
The case of Lautsi arose from a complaint launched by a parent against the permanent display of the crucifix in every classroom of an Italian state school attended by her children. She argued that the display of this religious symbol was contrary to the principle of secularism that she sought to inculcate in her children. The mother challenged the school's refusal to remove the crucifix before the national courts. However, an administrative court and the Italian State Council dismissed her complaint, arguing, in general, that the presence of the crucifix in the classroom did not violate her rights or the rights of her children, since it must be viewed as a symbol of Italian history, culture and identity. 7 The matter was then brought before the Second Chamber of the ECtHR. The applicant alleged that the display of the crucifix constituted an interference with her right to ensure that her children receive an education in conformity with her religious and philosophical convictions under Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the Convention, as well as a violation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion of herself and her children, recognised by Article 9 of the Convention. In its unanimous judgment, the Chamber ruled in favour of the applicants. It reasoned that the crucifix was a "powerful external symbol" with a predominantly religious meaning that could be emotionally disturbing for children belonging to religious minorities. 8 It further stated that the state has a duty to uphold confessional neutrality in public education. 9 Therefore, the Chamber concluded that "the compulsory display of a symbol of a particular faith in the exercise of public authority […] restricts the right of parents to educate their children in conformity with their convictions and the right of schoolchildren to believe or not believe".
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In accordance with Article 43 of the Convention, the Italian government requested that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. A panel of the Grand Chamber granted the request and, in light of its particular significance, the Grand Chamber subsequently granted leave to intervene in the process to a number of actors, including members of the European Parliament, non-governmental organisations, and several states.
11
The Grand Chamber overturned the unanimous decision of the Second Chamber by a supermajority. By 15 votes to 2, the Grand Chamber held that there had been no violation of the rights of the applicants given the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the states "in their efforts to reconcile exercise of the functions they assume in relation to education and teaching with respect for the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions". 12 This margin extends to the place they accord to religion within the school environment, as long as it does not amount to indoctrination.
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The Grand Chamber acknowledged that the margin afforded to the states on this matter is determined in part by the fact that "there is no European consensus on the question of the presence of religious symbols in state schools". 14 It further contended that, although the display of the crucifix does bestow preponderant visibility upon the religion of the majority, this does not amount to indoctrination, since the crucifix is essentially a "passive symbol", unlikely to have any influence on the students. 15 Furthermore, the Grand Chamber lent relevance to the fact that the presence of the crucifix is not accompanied by any compulsory religious education and that state schools in Italy are open to students of all religions on equal terms.
16

C. LAUTSI AND THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECTHR
A fair analysis of the jurisprudence of the ECtHR, including Lautsi, must recognise the daunting task faced by this court when adjudicating cases concerning religious matters, in light of the manifold relationships that exist among states and religions in Europe, where the absence of neutrality in church-state relations remains the norm. 17 The minimum common denominator unifying the European landscape is some form of national recognition of a right to religious freedom, reinforced by Article 9 and Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the Convention.
18
This, of course, should not be construed as exempting the Court's judgments on this issue from critical scrutiny. However, acknowledging this state of affairs from the outset highlights 11 The full list of all the intervenors to the case can be found in Lautsi (GC) (n 3), para 8. 12 Lautsi (GC) (n 3) para 69. 13 
D. WHY APPEARANCES MATTER: THE PROBLEM WITH THE SYMBOLIC ENDORSEMENT OF RELIGION BY THE STATE
Lautsi has attracted a considerable amount of criticism focusing on different aspects of the ruling. A first group of arguments disapproves or commends the judgment in light of the Court's institutional position. Joseph Weiler, for instance, praises the wisdom of the Grand Chamber's decision for its refusal to "short circuit the political and the constitutional adjudicative process in Italy". 37 Lorenzo Zucca, on the other hand, argues that the Court's judgment gave Italy too much leeway regarding the flimsy legal basis presented to support the mandate of the crucifix, instead of forcing it to revise its legislation in order to promote a legislative (and perhaps judicial) debate on the matter at the national level. "sends a message to non adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favoured members of the political community". 45 Or as Laborde rightly asserts: "[symbolic endorsement of religion] sends a message that some are not full members of the political community, that they cannot enter the public square on equal terms with others, and this will make it difficult for them fully to identify with their political institutions". 46 The permanent display of the crucifix in every classroom of Italian state schools can therefore be interpreted as having the effect of making religious affiliation relevant to the individual's standing in the political community. 47 This is particularly true in contexts where, as in Italy, the overwhelming majority of the population belongs (at least in nominative terms) to one particular religion and, as acknowledged by the Italian tribunals in this case, the symbols of that religion are thought to be a strong component of national identity.
A healthy democratic society requires a strong collective identity. 48 This can only be achieved through solidarity among citizens of all creeds. 49 This identity, however, must be made compatible with the plurality of viewpoints and comprehensive doctrines that are deemed to exist in an increasingly diverse society. In this sense, "democracy obliges us to show much more solidarity and much more commitment to one another in our joint political project than was demanded by the hierarchical and authoritarian societies of yesteryear". The unfair implications of the symbolic endorsement of religion in the public sphere, when it is associated with the exercise of a public function, such as education, are therefore not eliminated, even when the influence of religion is contained within the cultural domain.
The consensus of a previously homogeneous society regarding the role played by religion in the community needs to be rethought because, even when distinguishing the "truth claims"
from the cultural role of religion, a degree of inequality remains. 52 Although most European states continue to recognise or support the Christian religious denominations that have historically shaped their own identity, their commitment to political equality suggests a need to clarify and rethink the "unarticulated shared cultural norms which are breaking down as Europe becomes more culturally and religiously diverse". 53 In other words, a preoccupation with the rights of the states to develop and maintain their own culture should not outweigh the fundamental right to treatment as equals of all individuals that all liberal democracies are compelled to uphold. In this sense, a reminder of the Enlightenment's central achievement is necessary: "getting our fellow citizens to rely less on tradition, and to be more willing to experiment with new customs and institutions". 54 In the words of Gabriel and Liviu Andreescu: "[a] lay public sphere is the only solution to ensuring genuine equality between members of majority and minority churches, agnostics, atheists, or non-theists. In the long term, this is the only way to eliminate religious (and anti-religious) tensions". 55 Taylor has pointed out, "contemporary democracies, as they progressively diversify, will have to undergo redefinitions of their historical identities, which may be far-reaching and painful." 59 However, a commitment to the values that should guide every liberal democracy indicates that it is a price worth paying.
E. CONCLUSION
The need to develop a better understanding of secular thought and secular practice is tantamount to making this idea appealing. As long as there is a fundamental misunderstanding as to what it requires, the possibility of spreading this idea across Europe seems grim. The divergence of institutional arrangements regarding religion in Europe has made it impossible for the ECtHR to adhere to an interpretation of religious freedoms imposing strict neutrality on states. It has therefore interpreted the duty of states in this matter to be consistent with a margin of appreciation when discharging their public authority in the an alternate account of the unjust implications of this practice is possible by relying on a conception of citizenship that is concerned with the recognition of every individual on equal terms. Particularly given the increasing diversity that most European societies are experiencing, states should direct their attention to the issues arising from the lack of political equality. They should be concerned with the political community's ability to develop healthy democratic practices and the changes that they must make to their traditions in order to make this possible.
